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This paper introduces a data-driven, transparent and unbiased method to calculate
the economic costs of the Brexit vote in June 2016. We let a matching algorithm
determine a combination of comparison economies that best resembles the growth
path of the UK economy before the Brexit referendum. The economic cost of the
Brexit vote is the difference in output between the UK economy and and its synthetic
doppelganger. We show that, contrary to public perception, by the third quarter of
2017 the economic costs of the Brexit vote are already 1.3% of GDP. The cumulative
costs amount to almost 20 billion pounds and are expected to grow to more than 60
billion pounds by end-2018. We provide evidence that heightened policy uncertainty
has already taken a toll on investment and consumption.
Keywords: Brexit, European Union, policy uncertainty,
synthetic control method
JEL Codes: E65, F13, F42
∗Born: University of Bonn and CEPR, born@uni-bonn.de, Müller: University of Tübingen and
CEPR, gernot.mueller@uni-tuebingen.de, Schularick: University of Bonn and CEPR, schularick@uni-
bonn.de, Sedláček: University of Oxford and CEPR, petr.sedlacek@economics.ox.ac.uk. We thank Rubén
Domínguez Díaz for excellent research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies.
“He who wills the ends wills the means.”
Keynes, The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill
1 Introduction
On June 23, 2016 the UK electorate voted to leave the European Union. A return
to Britain’s pre-1973 position outside the European institutions could prove costly in
economic terms—just like Britain’s return on gold in the 1920s that Keynes referred to
in the quote. But how costly exactly? Existing estimates of the costs of Brexit vary by
a confusingly wide margin. It is not hard to see why. The future economic relationship
between the UK and the European Union is currently being negotiated and the outcome
is anybody’s guess. Different assumptions about the “deal” that Britain gets will lead to
very different estimates of the economic costs. But even for comparable outcome scenarios,
economists manage to arrive at conclusions that are miles apart.
That’s why we take a different route in this paper. Rather than forecasting the
economic costs of Brexit based on a specific set of assumptions which are necessarily
controversial we measure the actual output loss that has accumulated since the Brexit vote
and can be causally attributed to the decision. We will track and update these costs over
time with the novel “Brexit-Cost-Tracker” that this paper introduces. Importantly, our
approach does not hinge on having the right economic model for the British, the European,
or even the global economy. We do not need to forecast a particular Brexit deal, construct
scenarios for the outcome of the negotiations, or make debatable assumptions about
critical parameters in a theoretical model. Instead we identify the realized economic cost
of the Brexit decision for the UK economy by constructing an appropriate counterfactual
scenario.
To do this, we propose a transparent, unbiased and entirely-data driven approach. We
let an algorithm determine which combination of other economies matches the growth
trend of the UK economy before the Brexit vote with the highest possible accuracy. Which
economies get picked by the algorithm and what weight they are assigned is entirely data-
driven and open to replication by other researchers. The better the algorithm constructs
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a close match for the UK economy as a weighted combination of other economies before
the Brexit “treatment”, the more accurate our results will be. We use the largest possible
country dataset to obtain the best match possible.
In a next step, we can use this doppelganger of the pre-Brexit UK economy to determine
the costs of the Brexit decision, because it does not get “treated” with the Brexit decision.
The doppelganger continues to evolve in the way the pre-Brexit economy would have in
absence of the vote. In other words, it represents the counterfactual performance of the
UK economy had the referendum not taken place. From here it is easy. The difference
in output between the UK economy and its doppelganger captures the causal effect of
the referendum decision. This so-called synthetic control method has been successfully
applied to study the effects of similar one-off events such as German reunification, or the
introduction of tobacco laws (Abadie et al. 2010, 2015).
What do we find? The first important result is that the economic costs of the Brexit
vote are already visible and quite large. We show that, contrary to public perception,
by the third quarter of 2017 the output loss due to the Brexit vote is approximately
1.3%. Cumulatively, the loss is close to 20 billion pounds. Under current forecasts, the
cumulative costs are expected to grow to almost 65 billion pounds by end-2018. At this
point we expect output to be 2.2% below what would have been observed in the absence
of the Brexit vote. These figures use Bank of England forecasts for the UK economy, and
OECD forecasts for the control economies. In other words, even before Brexit actually
happens, the output loss triggered by the decision could be equivalent to about 8 years of
the UK’s net contribution to the EU.
What explains these large economic costs? In a first step, we decompose the effects
and study the evolution of consumption and investment in the UK economy relative to the
performance of the doppelganger economy. The economic costs of the Brexit vote are most
visible in consumption and investment spending. By Q3 2017, since the Brexit referendum
both consumption and investment grew about half as fast in Britain as they would have
otherwise. Somewhat surprisingly, the external sector has not cushioned the effects in a
meaningful way despite the sharp depreciation of the nominal and real exchange rate in
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the wake of the Brexit referendum.
What are the deeper economic reasons for the output decline? Two potential expla-
nations stand out. On the one hand, the reduction in output caused by the Brexit vote
could be due to the increased uncertainty linked to Britain’s future economic integration
with the continent. Such uncertainty may temporarily depress economic activity, but
in the absence of hysteresis effects the economy may bounce back once the uncertainty
is resolved. On the other hand, the observed decline could be due to the anticipation
of lower future living standards as the reduction in trade with the continent will make
Britain permanently poorer.
To throw some light on this question we analyze the differential effect of the Brexit vote
on the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index provided by Baker et al. (2016a). Using
the synthetic control method once more, we can measure the increase of economic policy
uncertainty in the UK due to the Brexit vote. We find that the increase in uncertainty has
indeed been substantial. It is even higher than the increase in policy uncertainty in the
Great Recession, but this time the effect is concentrated in the UK. Existing estimates put
the output cost of heightened policy uncertainty during the Great Recession at about one
percent of GDP (Baker et al. 2016a). However, as policy uncertainty is partly endogenous
to the state of the economy, these estimates may be upward biased and should be taken
with a grain of salt. This being said, at this point we cannot reject the idea that policy
uncertainty was a major driver of the output loss which has materialized in the UK
because of the Brexit vote.
Related literature: Our paper is not the first to address the economic consequences
of Brexit. Over the past year, different papers have attempted to estimate the economic
costs and consequences of the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. As mentioned above,
the magnitude of the results and the methods employed in these papers differ substantially.
Virtually all studies forecast negative output effects stemming from a reduction in trade,
a fall in foreign direct investment (FDI), or both.
HM Treasury (2016) use a gravity model of trade to assess the long-term economic
impact of leaving the EU under several scenarios for future trade agreements with the
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EU. The core result is that losses could be large, up to 6% of GDP in the long term.
Kierzenkowski et al. (2016) also consider different post-Brexit trade arrangements with the
EU and diverse channels that may hit the British economy at different horizons. In their
central scenarios, long-term losses accumulate to a 5% fall in GDP, while the short-term
effects are in the vicinity of a 3% drop of GDP. Finally, PricewaterhouseCoopers (2016),
commissioned by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), employs a computable general
equilibrium (CGE) model and forecast drops in output of around 3% both in the long
and short term.
IMF (2016) assess the long- and short-term economic impact of Brexit on the basis of
three scenarios of trading with the EU: bilateral agreement, EEA membership, and WTO
rules. The paper also studies the effects of uncertainty and risk aversion generated by
the withdrawal from the EU. The authors use a VAR analysis to construct an economic
uncertainty index, an episode analysis of the recent financial crisis and of the 1992
devaluation, and a macroeconomic model. They consider a limited uncertainty scenario,
that delivers output losses of 1.5% by 2019 for the UK, and an adverse scenario, generating
a GDP drop of 5.6%. The effects for the EU are much less severe, with Ireland being the
most affected country.
OxfordEconomics (2016) combine scenarios for trading arrangements and future policies.
In the best case scenario, they calculate a decrease in GDP of 0.1%. In the worst case
scenario, the UK suffers an output decline of 3.9% and a fall in income per head of 1000
pounds by 2030.
Booth et al. (2015) work with a dynamic multi-sector and multi-region CGE model.
They also generate different scenarios by combining several potential future trade ar-
rangements with economic deregulations that might be taken by the UK government. In
the pessimistic scenario where the UK operates under the WTO rules and there is no
deregulation, they forecast a GDP fall of 2.23% by 2030. In a positive scenario with a
favorable trade agreement and under an ambitious deregulation program, they predict
that output could actually grow by 1.55% in the long run. This meshes with a report by
the “Economists for Free Trade” who optimistically claim that Brexit could boost UK
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GDP. Specifically, Minford (2016) estimates a welfare gain of 4% of GDP if agricultural
and manufacturing prices fall sharply as a consequence of lower tariffs and trade barriers
than under current EU rules.
The focus of Ellen et al. (2016) is a scenario where the UK is hit by four shocks:
increase in tariffs, reduction in FDI, reduction of exports to EU members and loss of net
contributions to the EU budget. They find that exports are the main channel by which
the UK economy is hurt. They estimate output costs between 2% and 3% in the long run.
Similarly, Ebell and Warren (2016) consider the same channels and use as counterfactual
three trading arrangements, namely the current deals of Norway and Switzerland, plus
WTO rules. They find that the long-term deterioration of the economy and a shift towards
savings generates a decline in real wages and in consumption substantially higher than
for GDP, ranging from 2.2% to 6.3% for the former and from 2.4% to 5.4% for the latter.
Under the extra assumption that Brexit has a direct effect on productivity the economic
costs increase and are close to HM Treasury (2016)’s estimates. Bruno et al. (2016), in
a technical appendix, directly assess the impact of the withdrawal from the EU on FDI
inflows in the UK with a structural gravity approach, predicting a fall of 22% in FDI
inflows.
Drawing on CGE trade models, Mansfield (2013) approximates the costs of Brexit.
The long-term effects of Brexit on UK GDP GPD of the UK are estimated to be between
-2.6% and 1.1%. In the most probable scenario the impact on GDP is 0.1%. Using a static
general equilibrium model, Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) estimate the effects of Brexit
on trade, sectoral net value added, and real income for different scenarios. Depending on
the post-Brexit trade arrangement, costs range from 0.6% to 3% fall of GDP per capita.
Real income of EU members drops by 0.1% to 0.4% on average. Additionally, Aichele and
Felbermayr (2015) infer dynamic effects of Brexit on per-capita income from empirical
ad-hoc models. Taking dynamic effects to illustrate the impact of economic integration
on investment and innovation behavior into account, costs of Brexit increase to 2% to
14% of GDP per capita.
Extending a gravity model of trade to include sector-level input-output linkages in
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production, Vandenbussche et al. (2017) simulate different scenarios of Brexit (tariff/non-
tariff, hard/soft) and measure the impact on employment and valued-added production.
They find that the withdrawal from the EU hurts the UK economy much more than it
hurts the EU. In value-added terms, losses range from 1% in the most favorable scenario to
5% in a worst-case scenario. In their central forecasts, EU output drops by 0.3% and 1.5%
only. Focusing on welfare effects, Dhingra et al. (2017) use a multi-country quantitative
general equilibrium model of trade that includes several sectors with intermediate trade.
They simulate a hard and soft post-Brexit trade arrangement scenario and find that higher
trade barriers lead to large welfare losses for households in both cases, even taking into
account fiscal savings. The losses amount to 1.3% in the optimistic scenario and 2.7% in
the pessimistic scenario. Combining gravity estimates of trade with income per capita
elasticities to trade, they obtain losses in average income per capita that range from 6.3%
to 9.4%. Similarly, Forte and Portes (2017) measure the effect of lower immigration from
the EU, concluding that it could reduce GDP per capita by between 0.4% and 3.9% in
the long run.
Gudgin et al. (2016) develop a new simulation model for the UK economy that tracks
the long-term trends to quantify the consequences of Brexit. They construct different
scenarios and use the assumptions from the gravity model of the Treasury. They argue
that the output losses could be somewhat lower, reaching from 1% in the milder scenario
to 4% of GDP in the worst scenario. To measure the impact of the withdrawal of the UK
from the EU on FDI, McGrattan and Waddle (2017) use a multi-country neoclassical
growth model with multinational investment firms. By considering different restrictions
on FDI, either from the EU or the UK or both, they analyze negative output effects and
subsequent changes in employment and welfare.
As pointed out in Sampson (2017), these models do not consider the agglomeration
effects of the Brexit on the finance industry as a key sector in the UK economy. Djankov
(2017) finds substantial negative effects on the City of London if the UK trades under the
WTO rules with Europe, with finance revenues dropping by up to 18% and employment
losses that range between 7% and 8%.
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Ramiah et al. (2016) use stock market movements to quantify the impact of the Brexit
on different sectors. They calculate abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
for different sectors after the referendum. They associate positive CARs with expected
favorable effects for that sector and negative CARs with expected negative effects of
the Brexit on the sector. They find mainly negative abnormal returns. In other words,
financial markets are predicting negative effects of the Brexit, especially in the banking
sector.
A different approach – and the one most closely related to ours in this study – is
followed by Campos et al. (2014). They also use the synthetic control method to quantify
the economic benefits from EU membership and find large gains. Ironically, in their
analysis, carried out long before Brexit, the gains from membership are particularly large
for the United Kingdom.
2 Methods and Data
The comparison unit that serves as counterfactual or control group is of crucial importance
to determine the effects of a policy intervention or event. Ideally, the control group
has identical characteristics to the unit affected by the intervention so that the only
difference is that one group received treatment, the other did not. Put differently, both
units are comparable along all dimensions except for the treatment. In practice, this ideal
comparison unit is rarely available in observed data and identification of causal effects is
extremely challenging when the treated unit is a country.
However, most policy interventions take place at the aggregate level. One option is
to pursue comparative case studies. In such case studies, the researcher compares the
path of the aggregate outcome variable for the unit affected by the intervention with the
evolution of the same outcome variable for the control group. The problem here is that
aggregate units such as countries differ widely in their characteristics, making the selection
of the control group highly problematic. Also the absence of a systematic method to select
suitable comparison units can lead to biased results.
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2.1 Synthetic control method
In order to address these methodological challenges, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003)
have proposed a novel data-driven method, formalized in Abadie et al. (2010), called
the synthetic control method. The basic idea of this approach is that the best possible
control is a weighted combination of all available comparison units. This method provides
a transparent, data-driven, systematic procedure to construct comparison units that
overcome the main difficulties of comparative case studies.
Following Abadie et al. (2010) suppose that we observe J + 1 countries over T > 1
periods, where only the first country has been affected by an intervention at a period
T0 < T . The remaining J countries, potential comparison units, have not been affected at
all by the treatment and compose the “donor pool”. The choice of such a donor pool is
not innocuous. Potential comparison entities should be carefully selected, by choosing
those countries that best approximate the characteristics and outcome variable of the
treated country, in order to avoid interpolation bias.
Let Y Njt denote the value of the variable of interest that we would observe if country
j is not affected by the intervention at period t, and Y Ajt if it is affected. Assume that
there are no anticipation effects such that Y Njt = Y Ajt for all j = 1, . . . , J + 1 and all
t < T0. Hence, the causal effect of the intervention at period t = T0, . . . , T is given by
αt = Y A1t − Y N1t = Y1t − Y N1t . Thus, the causal effect of the policy intervention or event on
the outcome variable of interest could be identified if we observed the outcome variable in
absence of treatment Y N1t . In consequence, all that is missing is a counterfactual unit that
accurately approximates Y N1t . This is achieved by the construction of a proper synthetic
control.
Let X1 denote a (k × 1) vector of pre-treatment values of the outcome variable and
possibly also predictors of this outcome variable in the affected country. Let X0 denote a
(k × J) vector of the same variables for the different J countries in the donor pool. The
aim is to weigh the elements of X0 such that the resulting values closely resemble X1. Let
W denote a (J × 1) vector of weights wj , j = 2, . . . , J + 1. Each possible realization of W
will lead to a different synthetic control. The weights are restricted to be nonnegative and
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add up to one, forcing the synthetic control group to lie in the convex hull of the donor
pool and hence avoiding extrapolation without data support.
The more alike the treated country is to the donor pool, the better the match of its
characteristics with the synthetic control group will be. The selection of appropriate
potential control units is highly relevant. The optimal weights W ∗ are chosen such that
they minimize a weighted mean square error (X1 − X0W )′V (X1 − X0W ), subject to
wj >= 0 for j = 2, . . . , J + 1 and
∑J+1
j=2 wj = 1, where V is a (k × k) symmetric and
positive semidefinite matrix. The choice of V is not trivial since it affects the weighted
mean square error of the estimator and represents the different relevance assigned to
the characteristics in X1 and X0. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) choose V to be a
nonnegative diagonal matrix with higher weights allocated to units with large predictive
power on the outcome variable of interest. We follow Abadie et al. (2010) and choose the
elements of V using a data-driven cross-validation approach.
Once the weights W ∗ have been optimally chosen to minimize the distance between
the preintervention characteristics of the affected unit and the donor pool, the synthetic
control is given by Y ∗1t =
∑
wjYjt. The causal effect can then be estimated by αˆt = Y1t−Y ∗1t
for t = T0, . . . , T .
Several features of the method have been introduced in the description of the procedure
that are important to emphasize. First, explicitly computing the weights assigned to each
potential comparison unit makes the method transparent since it shows the individual
contribution of each unit of the donor sample and allows to measure how close the treated
and the control group are. Second, restricting the weights to be nonnegative and sum to
one prevents the synthetic control from lying outside the support of the data. Third, even
though extrapolation is avoided, interpolation bias might arise if the potential control
units have not been selected appropriately and present characteristics that are far from
the treated unit.
Additionally, one should be aware of the explicit assumptions made above. First, we
assume that only one country is affected by the treatment and there are no spillover effects
on the donor sample. Furthermore, since weights are constructed from pre-intervention
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characteristics, the assumption is that there are no differentiated shocks in the post
treatment period (Cavallo et al. 2013). Finally, the intervention is assumed to affect the
treated unit from the moment of the treatment. If there is reason to expect anticipation
effects, one would have to redefine the date of intervention to earlier periods. As the
Brexit vote was as a major surprise and not expected, a plausible assumption is that in
our case the treatment really begins with the outcome of the referendum on June 23rd
2016.
2.2 Inference
Traditional statistical inference in comparative case studies is difficult (e.g. due to small
samples and the absence of randomization). Abadie et al. (2015) propose to overcome
this limitation by considering a range of falsification exercises, so called placebo studies.
The basic idea of placebo studies is very intuitive. We can be confident that the
synthetic control estimator captures the causal effect of an intervention as long as similar
magnitudes are not estimated in cases where the intervention did not take place. Given
that we are investigating the causal effect of an intervention at a particular point in time
and in a particular country, there are two sets of placebo studies that naturally present
themselves.
First, the treatment date can be artificially assigned to a different point in time t < T0
(so called time placebo studies). Second, we can compute the causal effect of the treatment
for untreated countries, taken from the donor pool (so called country placebo studies).
Both types of exercises are conducted in Section 3.
2.3 Data
The group of candidate countries for the synthetic control group contains all OECD
countries for which we were able to obtain contiguous real GDP data starting in 1995Q1
(see Table 1 for a list). For the pre-Brexit-vote period, we use real GDP from the
OECD Economic Outlook database, both for the UK and for the doppelganger. For
the doppelganger, we also use this dataset for the post-Brexit-vote period, where data
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from 2017Q2 onwards are forecasts. For the UK from 2016Q2 to 2017Q3, we splice the
OECD data in 2016Q1 with realized growth rates from the Office of National Statistics
(ONS). From 2017Q4 till 2018Q4, we use real GDP growth rate forecasts from the Bank
of England. The data for the decomposition exercise is build similarly. Consumption
and investment for the control group have been obtained from the OECD Quarterly
National Accounts and from the Office of National Statistics (ONS) for the UK. Real
private consumption is the sum of real final consumption expenditure of both households
and non-profit institutions serving households, real investment is total gross fixed capital
formation, and net exports is the external balance of goods and services. The inflation
series, computed as the change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI), including all items,
with respect to the previous quarter, are obtained from OECD Economic Outlook, both
for the donor country group and for the UK. The quarterly long-term and short-term
nominal interest rates also come from the OECD Finance database for the control group
and the UK, and are calculated as quarterly averages of monthly values. Finally, the Bank
of International Settlements (BIS) provides the data series for the nominal exchange rates;
namely effective exchange rates constructed by the BIS by weighting a broad basket of
currencies.
For the uncertainty analysis, we use the Baker et al. (2016a) Economic Policy Uncer-
tainty index available at www.policyuncertainty.com. The index is based on a count of
newspaper articles containing the terms uncertain or uncertainty, economic or economy,
and one or more policy-relevant terms. We will be working with monthly observations
form January 1998 to September 2017.
3 Results
In this section we present the core results of the analysis. First, we construct the
doppelganger based on data for the pre-Brexit vote period. This doppelganger serves
as the counterfactual UK economy that has not received the “treatment” of the Brexit
vote. Contrasting the output growth path of the UK and of the counterfactual, we derive
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Figure 1: Real GDP of UK (blue line) and doppelganger (red line). Note: Shaded area
corresponds to one standard deviation of difference between UK and Doppelganger prior to
Brexit vote. Dashed lines are forecasts. Data sources for UK before 2016Q1 from OECD
Economic Outlook; 2016Q1 – 2017Q3 from ONS 2017Q4–2018Q4 based on forecasts by
BoE. Data for doppelganger from OECD Economic Outlook.
the output costs of Brexit. Third, we run a number of placebo test which show that the
effects captured in our baseline specification are indeed attributable to the Brexit vote.
Lastly, we describe how the Brexit vote transmitted through the economy.
3.1 Introducing the doppelganger
The doppelganger that serves as the counterfactual is a synthetic economy: a weighted
average of 30 OECD economies. The weights are determined by a matching algorithm.
We match the evolution of real GDP of the UK and the doppelganger prior to the Brexit
vote as accurately as possible. For this purpose, we normalize the index of real GDP to
unity in 1995 in each country and then obtain the combination of countries that best
matches the evolution of UK quarterly GDP from 1995 until the second quarter of 2016.
Figure 1 displays the time series for real GDP in the UK (blue lines) and in the
doppelganger economy (red line). The dashed lines indicates periods for which only
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Table 1: Composition of synthetic control: country weights
Australia <0.01 Austria <0.01 Belgium <0.01 Canada 0.15
Chile <0.01 Czech Republic <0.01 Estonia <0.01 Finland <0.01
France <0.01 Germany <0.01 Greece <0.01 Hungary 0.24
Iceland <0.01 Ireland 0.04 Israel <0.01 Italy 0.03
Japan 0.25 Korea <0.01 Luxembourg 0.04 Mexico <0.01
Netherlands <0.01 New Zealand 0.04 Norway 0.03 Portugal <0.01
Slovak Republic <0.01 Slovenia <0.01 Spain <0.01 Sweden <0.01
Switzerland <0.01 United States 0.19
forecasts are available. The shaded area represents one standard deviation of the pre-
treatment difference between the UK and its doppelganger. Note that the match is
imperfect as our procedure determines 30 free parameters (country weights) in order to
match more than 80 observations.
This being said, prior to the Brexit vote both series display a very high degree of
co-movement—both at low and high frequencies. Not only do both economies experience
smaller recessions almost identically, the path during the Great Recession is also very
similar. We are thus confident that the doppelganger provides a meaningful counterfactual
which allows us to quantity the effect of the Brexit vote on economic activity in the UK.
Table 1 displays the country weights (rounded to the second digit) which define the
doppelganger economy. The United States and Canada, but also Japan and Hungary
are assigned the largest weights. Together they account for more than 80 percent of the
doppelganger dynamics. This is plausible, given the position of the UK in the world
economy and the fact that it operates within the EU, but outside the Euro area (like
Hungary). There are also smaller contributions from Ireland, Italy, and Luxembourg.
3.2 The output effect of the Brexit vote
We are now in a position to quantify the effect of the June 2016 vote on real GDP in the
UK. In order to do this we contrast the output development of the UK and that of its
doppelganger from Q3 2016 onwards. For this purpose Figure 2 reproduces Figure 1, but
zooms in on the post-Brexit-vote period. As before, the shaded area corresponds to one
standard deviation of the pre-treatment difference between UK and doppelganger and the
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Figure 2: Real GDP of UK (blue line) and doppelganger (red line). Note: Shaded area
corresponds to one standard deviation of difference between UK and doppelganger prior to
Brexit vote. Dashed lines are forecasts. Data sources for UK before 2016Q1 from OECD
Economic Outlook; 2016Q1 – 2017Q3 from ONS 2017Q4–2018Q4 based on forecasts by
BoE. Data for doppelganger from OECD Economic Outlook.
dashed lines refer to periods for which only forecasts are available.
A number of observations stand out. Throughout most of 2016 there is hardly any
effect of the output vote on UK’s output. Yet starting in 2017, the effects begin to
materialize as the UK embarks on an different growth trajectory. The effect is also
statistically significant as it leaves the statistical boundaries as what can be accounted for
as a normal, given the pre-treatment variation in output paths between the UK and its
doppelganger. Under current forecasts, the trend is persisting until the end of 2018 and
the output gap between the doppelganger and the UK that we causally attribute to the
Brexit vote will increase.
We provide specific numbers in Table 2. The middle column reports the output loss
in percentage points of real GDP. In the second quarter of 2016, there is virtually no
output gap between the UK and the doppelganger. The gap emerges slowly and gradually,
reaching only 40 basis points at the end of 2016. However, by the end of the third quarter
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Period GDP loss (in p.p.) Cum. GDP loss (in bn. pounds)
2016Q2 0.05 0.24
2016Q3 0.35 1.97
2016Q4 0.39 3.87
2017Q1 0.77 7.61
2017Q2 1.10 12.99
2017Q3 1.28 19.26
2017Q4 1.45 26.32
2018Q1 1.60 34.14
2018Q2 1.87 43.25
2018Q3 2.04 53.18
2018Q4 2.19 63.90
Table 2: Brexit costs. Note: second column reports percentage point loss in real GDP
computed as the difference in post-referendum paths in Figure 2; third column: cumulated
losses in billion of pounds computed as column 2 multiplied with non-annualized nominal
GDP in 2016Q2 and cumulated. UK before 2016Q1 based on OECD EO data, 2016Q1–
2017Q3 based on ONS realizations, 2017Q4–2018Q4 based on BoE forecasts. Data for
doppelganger from OECD Economic Outlook (forecasts for 2017Q2–2018Q4).
of 2017, the last quarter for which data are available, the output loss due to the Brexit
vote has reached roughly 1.3 percentage points. On current forecasts it will exceed 2
percentage points by mid-2018. The right column of Table 2 reports the cumulative output
loss in terms of billions of pounds (in prices of Q2 2016). By now, that is, after the third
quarter of 2017, the output loss due to the Brexit votes amounts to approximately 20
billion.
3.3 Placebo experiments
Are these effects causal in the sense that we can attribute them to the Brexit vote? We
run two types of experiments to gauge whether our benchmark results are indeed picking
up the causal effect of the Brexit vote on UK GDP (see also Section 2). First, we run
twelve “time-placebo tests” for which we shift the treatment date artificially backward in
time. In other words, we assume treatment dates prior to the 2016Q2, and allow for such
placebo treatments in all quarters from 2013Q2 up until 2016Q1. We then re-estimate
our synthetic control for UK GDP for each of these placebo treatment dates using exactly
the same methodology as in the benchmark specification. If our baseline estimate is truly
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Figure 3: Real GDP of UK (blue line) and doppelganger (red line): alternative treatment
dates. Note: left panel shows full sample, right panel zooms in on Brexit episode and
recenters y-axis. Red line represents result of baseline specification, blue line actual data
for UK; dashed lines indicate forecasts; shaded area represents range of maximum and
minimum value of the synthetic controls generated by placebo studies with treatment
date ranging from 2013Q2 to 2016Q1.
picking up a causal effect of the intervention, then the synthetic controls estimated in
each of the time placebo studies should track the baseline estimate and diverge from the
UK GDP data only after the actual Brexit vote in 2016Q2.1
Figure 3 shows the results together with the series for actual GDP (blue line) and
our benchmark doppelganger (red line). The shaded areas represent point-wise the range
between the maximum and minimum value of the synthetic controls across the twelve time-
placebo experiments. Reassuringly, the band is rather narrow and tracks the evolution of
the doppelganger established earlier closely. Importantly, despite that the time-placebo
studies work with earlier “fictitious” Brexit-vote dates, the resulting synthetic controls
diverge from the UK data only after the actual Brexit vote in 2016Q2.
Next, we estimate synthetic controls for each of the countries in the donor pool while
exposing them to a treatment in 2016Q2. Once again, if our benchmark estimate is
picking up the causal effect of the intervention, then the divergence of country-specific
synthetic controls from the respective GDP data following the treatment date should be
considerably smaller than in case of the UK.
Figure 4 shows the results of the country-placebo experiments. It quantifies how
1Note that the placebo study estimates will not be identical to the benchmark since they are based on
a shorter pre-treatment sample due to the earlier treatment dates.
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Figure 4: Result of country-placebo experiments. Note: ratio of post-to-pre treatment fit;
left: mean squared prediction error (RMSPE), right: maximum absolute prediction error
(MAPE). Each country of the donor pool is exposed to Brexit-vote treatment in 2016Q2.
closely the country-specific synthetic controls follow the data post-treatment relative to
the pre-treatment fit. The left panel reports the post-and-pre-treatment ratio of the root
mean squared prediction error (RMSPE). The right panel reports the ratio based on the
maximum absolute prediction error (MAPE). We provide more details in the appendix.
Using such relative measures controls for the fact that the estimated country-specific
synthetic controls are characterized by different degrees of accuracy across countries.
Intuitively, the larger the value of these relative measures, the stronger is the deviation
of the synthetic control from the data after the intervention (compared to its average
pre-intervention fit).
As is apparent from Figure 4, the UK stands out from the donor pool for both
measures, RMSPE and MAPE. Still, the figure shows that several other countries are also
characterized by post-treatment deviations which are larger than the average pre-treatment
fit (that is, relative measures greater than 1).2 This could be indicating certain spill-over
effects of the Brexit vote onto these countries. Such spill-over effects would violate the
assumption that the donor pool countries are unaffected by the treatment. We therefore
consider restricting the donor pool of countries as a robustness check in the appendix, but
the results are very similar to those which we obtain for our baseline specification.
2Note that while the method is fitting pre-treatment data and therefore the post-treatment fit is likely
to be worse, the post-treatment period is relatively short (10 quarters). Therefore, it is not a priori clear
whether the two measures of relative fit, RMSPE and MAPE, will indeed be larger than one since chance
may have it that the post-treatment doppelganger remains to fit the data well.
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Figure 5: Evolution of macroeconomic aggregates in UK (blue) and doppelganger (red)
economy: post referendum. Note: doppelganger as in Figure 1; vertical axis measures
deviations from 2016Q2 in percent of GDP (i.e., percent deviations of the macroeconomic
aggregates are scaled by their share of GDP in 2016Q2 in the UK).
3.4 Transmission mechanism
We have shown that the Brexit decision has already had substantial output costs that are
expected to grow to more than 60 billion pounds before the UK even leaves the EU. In
this section, we shed light on how the effects of Brexit vote were transmitted to the UK
economy. We first look into the reaction of several macroeconomic variables – consumption,
investment, government spending, net exports – and compare their post-referendum path
to the doppelganger. In a second step, we look deeper into potential economic explanations
for the output loss after the Brexit vote, and pay particular attention to heightened policy
uncertainty as a key suspect.
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3.4.1 Decomposing the output loss
Figure 5 shows the evolution of macroeconomic aggregates after the Brexit vote for the
UK and for the doppelganger economy. Here and in what follows, the results for the
doppelganger are computed using the weights which we obtained by matching the series
for real GDP prior to 2016Q2, as detailed in Section 3.1 above. In each instance, because
of limited data availability, we only consider data up to the second quarter of 2017, but
we will update the charts as we track the performance of the UK economy over time.
At this point the gap between consumption in the doppelganger economy and in the
economy is equivalent to 0.9 percentage point of GDP (upper-left panel). The gap for
investment (gross fixed capital formation) is somewhat smaller, but of a similar order of
magnitude (upper-right panel). As investment accounts for a considerably smaller fraction
of GDP, the percentage decline of investment (relative to the doppelganger) is therefore
much more pronounced. We can thus confirm that tepid investment spending is a key
reason for the weak performance of the UK economy after the Brexit vote.
We do not find substantial deviations for either government spending or net exports.
Government consumption (lower-right panel) is fairly flat, both in the UK and in the
doppelganger economy. Perhaps more surprising is that net exports have not made a
larger positive contribution to the performance of the UK economy after the substantial
devaluation of the pound. Yet except for a large, but temporary drop in the third quarter
of 2016 the gap between the doppelganger and the UK is rather small (lower-left panel).
The evolution of the UK exchange rate is shown together with that of the doppelganger
in the upper-left panel of Figure 6. While one might suspect that valuation effects are
key for the drop of net exports, data on trade volumes suggest that net exports declined
because the volume of imports rose sharply in 2016Q3 and to a lesser extent because
export volumes contracted (Office for National Statistics 2016).
On balance, net exports did not make a distinctly positive contribution to output
growth although a full year has passed since the nominal and the real depreciation of the
pound.3
3The decline in net export is matched by a strong increase of inventories (not shown). Hence, even
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Figure 6: Evolution of macroeconomic indicators in UK (blue) and doppelganger (red)
economy: post referendum. Note: doppelganger as in Figure 1; deviations from 2016Q2
in percentage points except for the exchange rate (percent).
Figure 6 shows furthermore that post-referendum the UK saw inflation rise and interest
rates decline—notably in comparison to the doppelganger economy. The implied monetary
stance was particularly loose and may have contributed to stabilize domestic absorption
in the first year after the Brexit vote, even though the exchange-rate depreciation did
little to boost net exports.
3.4.2 Economic policy uncertainty
A year after the Brexit vote the adverse effects on output have become more and more
visible, driven by relative losses in investment and consumption. Yet through which channel
did the referendum affect spending in the economy? Two factors could be responsible
for the decline. One the one hand, economic activity may be contracting relative to
though net exports drop strongly and the other expenditure components shown in Figure 5 are fairly
stable, output is also fairly stable.
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the doppelganger, because market participants are more pessimistic about the long-run
growth prospects of the post-Brexit UK economy. We refer to this conjecture as the “bad
news hypothesis”.
On the other hand, the negative effects could be due to heightened economic policy
uncertainty. As the future relationship between the UK and Europe has become a
subject of intense political debates, uncertainty about economic policies has increased.
This, in turn, is likely to be detrimental for economic activity, even if on average the
long-term growth outlook has not been downgraded (Bloom 2009; Born and Pfeifer
2014; Fernández-Villaverde et al. 2015). We refer to this conjecture as the “uncertainty
hypothesis”.
In a first step, we try to quantify what role the increase in uncertainty has played for
the output decline. We start by establishing the increase in economic policy uncertainty
due to the Brexit vote. For this purpose we apply once more the synthetic control method,
this time we match to the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index provided by Baker
et al. (2016a). This index measures the volume of news articles discussing economic policy
uncertainty (normalized to average 100).
Results are shown in Figure 7. The blue line represents the policy index for the UK, the
red line shows the EPU in the doppelganger economy. As before, shaded area denotes one
standard deviation of the pre-treatment difference between UK and doppelganger. Note
that in this case the doppelganger economy is not identical to the output doppelganger
discussed above because of data availability.
Figure 7 shows that the increase in uncertainty in the UK due to the Brexit vote
has been truly remarkable. It dwarfs even the increase in policy uncertainty during the
Great Recession. Still, as Baker et al. (2016b) point out, the increase in EPU has been
concentrated in the UK, a fact which is also borne out by Figure 7. This is remarkable
because global policy uncertainty has been rather high due to, among other things, the
US presidential elections. Yet we find that the increase of EPU in the UK exceeds the
increase in the EPU-doppelganger by about 250 points in the year after the Brexit vote.
As Baker et al. (2016b) argue, the uncertainty effect of the Brexit vote is concentrated
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Figure 7: Economic policy uncertainty in the UK (blue line) and in a (new) doppelganger
economy (red line). Note: economic policy uncertainty index based on Baker et al. (2016a).
Shaded area denotes one standard deviation of the pre-treatment difference between UK
and doppelganger. EPU: scaled and standardized measure of the number of news articles
discussing economic policy uncertainty (normalized to average 100).
in the UK, but its effect may be comparable to the (smaller) increase of uncertainty during
the Great Recession that translated into a decline of economic activity by about one
percentage point. In any case, at this point we cannot reject the uncertainty hypothesis or,
put differently, that the output loss which has materialized so far is due to increased policy
uncertainty. Yet as current forecasts suggest that the output loss is going to increase
further, the anticipation of the post-Brexit regime, i.e., the bad news channel, could come
to play a more prominent role going forward.
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4 Conclusion
The Brexit referendum of June 23, 2016 was a momentous political decision taken with
very little knowledge of its economic implications. The binary choice question “Should
the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European
Union?” left important issues open. Did “leave” voters vote to leave the Single Market,
adopt an EFTA, or a WTO framework? How many leave voters would have preferred to
remain if the alternative is a bare-bones WTO trading arrangement? It is impossible to
say how people would have voted had the concrete options been spelled out. Economists
are keenly aware that establishing collective preferences is highly complex and can quickly
lead to Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
It is little surprising then that until today the debate about the “type” of Brexit
continues. This paper presents the first empirical assessment of the realized costs of the
Brexit vote and brings potentially important guidance for policy-makers and the general
public. While the details of the Brexit process are still unclear, we show that the costs are
already being felt and are likely to grow (if current GDP forecasts are correct). Moreover,
the effects are substantial in economic terms, accumulating to many years of the UK’s
net contribution to the EU. By Q2, the output costs of the Brexit vote are equivalent to
about 300 million pounds in lost output per week – a prominent measure in the campaign.
In the 1920s, Keynes critically commented on the plan to bring Britain back to the
gold standard by saying that “He who wills the end, wills the means.” On the one hand,
Keynes implied that if there is political determination to achieve a goal, the ways to make
it happen will be found even it is the wrong choice to begin with. Yet on the other hand,
Keynes dictum also alerts us to the fact that political resolve can trump but not substitute
economic logic. The means will be found, but the economic costs cannot be avoided.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Further details on country placebo studies
This subsection provides further details on the country placebo studies discussed in the
main text. Let us first explicitly describe the calculations involved in the results. The
main statistics of interest are the relative measures of fit post- and pre-treatment in the
donor countries (and the UK). The main text considers two such statistics, the relative
root mean squared prediction error (RMSPE) and the maximum absolute prediction
error (MAPE). These relative measures are defined as ρ1 = RMSPEpost/RMSPEpre and
ρ2 =MAPEpost/MAPEpre. The pre-intervention fit is given by
RMSPEpre =
√√√√ 1
T0 − 1
T0−1∑
t=1
(Y ∗t − Yt)2 (5.1)
MAPEpre = max |Y ∗t − Yt| , t ∈ [1, T0 − 1] (5.2)
The post-treatment measures of fit are defined similarly with the treatment date prediction
error normalized to zero
RMSPEpost =
√√√√
T − T0 − 1
T∑
t=T0
(
Y ∗t − Yt − Y ∗T0 + YT0
)2
(5.3)
MAPEpost = max
∣∣∣Y ∗t − Yt − Y ∗T0 + YT0∣∣∣ , t ∈ [T0, T ] (5.4)
There are two points to note in the above definitions. First, the reason for considering
relative measures of fit is that different countries are characterized by different degrees of
accuracy with which the synthetic control tracks the data. In our sample, this heterogeneity
in the degree of accuracy is enormous. While the root mean squared prediction error
between 1995 and 2016 is 0.005 in the UK, it is e.g. 0.13 in Greece or 0.08 in Ireland.
The average pre-treatment RMSPE for the donor countries is almost five times as large
as that for the UK. Therefore, when comparing the post-treatment deviations across
countries, one must take into account much poorer fit of the synthetic controls in the
donor pool countries. Second, the reason for normalizing the post-treatment prediction
error to zero at the treatment date accounts for the fact that the post-treatment time-path
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of the prediction error may be a continuation of previous trends rather than the result
of the treatment. Examples of this are given in Figure 8 which plots the log-difference
between the synthetic control and the data for the UK and three other countries which
exhibit large post-treatment deviations. However, as is apparent from the Figure, these
post-treatment deviations are the result of a poor prior fit, rather than of the Brexit vote.
Therefore, normalizing the treatment prediction error to zero accounts for the fact that
certain countries “inherit” a large deviation around 2016 simply due to the poor fit of the
synthetic control.
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Figure 8: Deviations of synthetic controls from data (in log points)
5.2 Robustness regarding donor pool
The country place studies in the main text reveal that the UK stands out in terms of its
post-treatment deviation, relative to the average pre-treatment fit. This suggests that
indeed our baseline results are picking up a causal effect of the Brexit vote on UK GDP,
since other countries do not display large deviations following their own (fictitious) Brexit
referendum. Nevertheless, several countries (Austria, France, Iceland and Slovenia) do
display relative post/pre-treatment deviations larger than 1, suggesting that perhaps they
were subject to spillover effects from the UK. Such spillover effects, however, would violate
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the assumption of no treatment in the donor pool countries.
In this subsection, we investigate whether our benchmark results are robust to the
exclusion of the above countries. Specifically, we re-estimate our baseline model, but
exclude Austria, France, Iceland and Slovenia from the donor pool of countries. Table
3 displays the country weights in the baseline results and those obtained when using
the restricted donor pool. Figure 9 then shows the evolution of UK GDP, the baseline
synthetic control and that estimated using the restricted donor pool. As can be seen, the
estimated weights using the restricted sample are very similar to those in the baseline
estimation. Similarly, the resulting synthetic controls is almost indistinguishable from it’s
baseline counterpart.
Table 3: Composition of synthetic control group: country weights
baseline
Australia 0.00 Austria 0.00 Belgium 0.00
Canada 0.15 Chile 0.00 Czech Republic 0.00
Estonia 0.00 Finland 0.00 France 0.00
Germany 0.00 Greece 0.00 Hungary 0.24
Iceland 0.00 Ireland 0.04 Israel 0.00
Italy 0.03 Japan 0.25 Korea 0.00
Luxembourg 0.04 Mexico 0.00 Netherlands 0.00
New Zealand 0.04 Norway 0.03 Portugal 0.00
Slovak Republic 0.00 Slovenia 0.00 Spain 0.00
Sweden 0.00 Switzerland 0.00 United States 0.19
restricted donor pool
Australia 0.00 Austria NA Belgium 0.00
Canada 0.15 Chile 0.00 Czech Republic 0.00
Estonia 0.00 Finland 0.00 France NA
Germany 0.00 Greece 0.00 Hungary 0.23
Iceland NA Ireland 0.04 Israel 0.00
Italy 0.04 Japan 0.24 Korea 0.00
Luxembourg 0.04 Mexico 0.00 Netherlands 0.00
New Zealand 0.05 Norway 0.00 Portugal 0.00
Slovak Republic 0.00 Slovenia NA Spain 0.00
Sweden 0.00 Switzerland 0.00 United States 0.21
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Figure 9: UK (blue line) vs. Baseline doppelganger (red line) vs. Restricted donor pool
doppelganger (black line). Note: Dashed lines are forecasts. Shaded area denotes one
standard deviation of the pre-treatment difference between UK and Baseline doppelganger.
UK before 2016Q1 based on OECD EO data, 2016Q1 – 2017Q3 based on ONS realizations,
2017Q4 – 2018Q4 based on BoE forecasts. Synthetic country based on OECD EO data
(forecasts for 2017Q2 – 2018Q4).
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